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Abstract
We examine financial constraints and forms of finance used for investment, by
analysing survey data on 157 large privatised companies in Hungary and Poland for the
period 1998 – 2000. The Bayesian analysis using Gibbs sampling is carried out to
obtain inferences about the sample companies’ access to finance from a model for
categorical outcome. By applying alternative measures of financial constraints we find
that foreign companies, companies that are part of domestic industrial groups and
enterprises with concentrated ownership are all less constrained in their access to
finance. Moreover, we identify alternative modes of finance since different corporate
control and past performance characteristics influence the sample firms’ choice of
finance source. In particular, while being industry-specific, the access to domestic credit
is positively associated with company size and past profitability. Industrial group
members tend to favour bond issues as well as sells-offs of assets as appropriate types
of finance for their investment programmes. Preferences for raising finance in the form
of equity are associated with share concentration in a non-monotonic way, being most
prevalent in those companies where the dominant owner holds 25-49% of shares. Close
links with a leading bank not only increase the possibility of bond issues but also appear
to facilitate access to non-banking sources of funds, in particular, to finance supplied by
industrial partners. Finally, reliance on state finance is less likely for the companies
whose profiles resemble the case of unconstrained finance, namely, for companies with
foreign partners, companies that are part of domestic industrial groups and companies
with a strategic investor. Model implications also include that the use of state funds is
less likely for Polish than for Hungarian companies.
JEL classification: G32, P31, P34, F23, L33
Key words: financial constraints, investment, enterprises, foreign ownership, industrial
groups, concentrated ownership, leading bank, proportional-odds model, Bayesian
updating.
                                                          
♣ The survey was financed by the European Commission (Phare ACE Programme P98-1048-R) and the
coding and preparation of the dataset by the MC Grabowski Fund. We express our gratitude to the
sponsors. We also take exclusive responsibility for all the opinions expressed in this study. We are
indebted to Igor Filatotchev and Piotr Kozarzewski who co-authored the questionnaire, to Piotr
Kozarzewski and Peter Vince for their excellent work supervising the surveys and to Kate Bishop and
Beata Monthey for their work on the preparation of the database.
31. Introduction
The measurement and determinants of financial constraints is a highly debated issue in
the finance literature. The existence of financing constraints has implications for
investment, financial system stability and economic development. Moreover,
understanding factors shaping access to finance is of great importance for informing
decisions supporting the process of market-oriented reforms. Financing constraints and
access to finance generally refer to the notion of availability of external finance and
hierarchy of finance, where “internally generated finance for investment is available at
lower cost than external finance.” That contrasts with the earlier neoclassical model of
investment, “in which firms have access to unlimited sources of investment at an
exogenously given cost” (Bond and Meghir, 1994, p.197). 
A large body of empirical evidence on the underlying multidimensional phenomenon
relies on imperfect proxies, rendering inference vulnerable to alternative interpretations
and criticism. The nature of studies describing and explaining financing constraints
faced by the firms in the undergoing institutional change transition economies, where
capital markets are underdeveloped and financial systems are ‘bank-oriented’, appears
even more complex than that of investigations of financing options and budget
constraints in firms in the high-income economies. Several arguments are advanced in
the literature as explanations of the differences in financing structures. First, the
transition economics literature notes a greater role of funds supplied by domestic
industrial-financial groups and foreign direct investors for overcoming firms’
constraints in access to finance. Second, given nascent capital markets with thin trading
in corporate securities and inadequate protection of minority shareholders under
prevailing corporate governance structures and practices, ownership concentration can
be offered as a partial explanation for financing constraints faced by transition firms.
However, the direction of the impact of concentrated ownership on access to finance
may vary. While company financiers may believe in gains of better monitoring provided
by concentrated ownership, they are also likely to appreciate that such positive effects
can be negated by the costs attributable to the agency problem resulting from
concentrated equity holdings. The latter problem arises if for dominant equity holders,
the entrenchment effects outweigh the incentive effects (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).1
Third, in transition economies, government sponsored finance tends to play a role in
relaxing financial constraints for some companies, with the effect not necessary being
efficiency enhancing.
Our reading of the literature suggests that the issue of understanding financing
constraints, especially in the context of transition economies, is calling for new
operational measurements of the multidimensional concept and for more sophisticated
empirical design employing survey instruments. In this study we contribute to the
literature by constructing new indicators designed to exploit information on large
industrial firms to identify the relative importance of firm- and industry-level factors on
access to and choice of financing sources over a recent period in a survey sample. We
find that the presence of financing constraints is associated with the degree of
ownership concentration. It also depends on ownership structures and is modified by
ties with a leading bank. Moreover, by examining various types of financing, we show
that avenues for overcoming financial constraints are determined by the foreign
investor’ interest in the firm. Specifically, the range of finance sources accessible to
                                                          
1 In addition, the finance literature stresses that in closely held firms, adequate monitoring by lenders is
difficult and costly because the information asymmetries result in the agency problem of equity. When a
company with limited liability becomes financially distressed, equity takes on ‘call option’ characteristics
(Black and Scholes, 1973; Merton, 1974) and most downside costs will be born by creditors. That might
provide an incentive and opportunity for the owners to misrepresent investment risks and returns and to
take riskier actions than they would be willing to take in the absence of limited liability. 
4domestic companies differs from that available to firms with foreign ownership. The
results also suggest that access to finance is influenced by company size and industry
sector. We conduct an analysis of the survey data on large privatised industrial firms by
using the Bayesian approach, which allows a more natural interpretation of parameter
credible intervals and provides finite sample inference on the determinants of access to
finance. Section 2 of this paper discusses the rationale for the choice of Hungary and
Poland. Section 3 reviews the theoretical literature and some empirical results on
financing constraints and addresses the relationship between firm- and industry-level
factors and availability of external finance. Section 4 deals with design of the interview
survey and the sample. Section 5 discusses the methodology for data analysis, while
results are reported in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.   
2. Why Hungary and Poland?
One particular problem related to financial constraints is that their economic
implications may be very different, as they are affected by the nature of the financial
environment. Relaxing financial constraints is beneficial only when the resulting
allocation of funds is efficient. In particular, in the case of ‘soft budget constraints’
(Kornai 1986, 2001), the outcome may have the negative implications for the stability
of financial systems, and for the overall macroeconomic stability. This argument was
accentuated in a seminal contribution by McKinnon (1993), who argues that in the early
phase of transition (liberalisation), i.e. before the financial systems consolidate, it is
beneficial to impose hard financial constrains on industrial companies, restricting their
access to external finance. This may be the only feasible second-best solution, as the
financial sector stability remains a priority.2 Moreover, empirical evidence on economic
growth in transition indicates that in the early phase, large productivity gains were
available without high levels of investment, as documented by available empirical
estimates of growth functions.3
These considerations have important implications for our choice of the sample. Firstly,
we wish to focus on the countries and periods of time, which represent a sufficiently
advanced stage of reforms and restructuring processes when investment becomes again
a critical factor in restructuring and productivity enhancement. That justifies our choice
of Hungary and Poland and our specification of mid 2001 as the relevant time period for
conducting a questionnaire-based survey. All existing evidence points out that at the
beginning of the new millennium, these two countries no longer suffered from soft
budget constraint problems widespread in some other transition economies. Where the
problems persist, these are mostly restricted to the residual state-owned sector in
branches such as mining and heavy industry (Driffill and Mickiewicz, 2003). As our
sample frame is restricted to privatised companies, majority of the soft budget constraint
cases is eliminated by default.
The choice of Hungary and Poland is advantageous from another point of view. Both
countries are characterised by variation in industrial structures and finance sources.
Unlike in most transition economies, capital markets function relatively well. In
particular, since the early 1990s, the Warsaw Stock Exchange was unique in the region
as a viable source of new capital, while in other countries, the stock exchanges were
only used for privatisation related floatations (Glaeser et al. 2001). Yet, in a more recent
period, the performance of the Budapest Stock Exchange has not been different, or has
even been better than that of the Warsaw Stock Exchange.
                                                          
2 A dissenting view is implied by Calvo and Coricelli (1992). They argue that the excessive financial
constraints played a critical role in the early ‘transitional recession’. See also Campos and Coricelli
(2002) for more recent overview.
3 See for instance Christofferson and Doyle (2000), Havrylyshyn and van Rooden (2003). An overview is
offered by Campos and Coricelli (2002).
5The reverse logic applies to foreign direct investment. Hungary was a single transition
country that became open to foreign direct investment very early, and by now records
very high levels of foreign ownership in its enterprise sector. In this respect, Poland was
initially lagging behind, and acceleration in inflow of foreign capital has been observed
from mid 1990s. By now Poland has a significant foreign-owned industrial sector.
Furthermore, in some countries, the privatisation process was completed with a
dominant role played by a single privatisation method. Examples of that situation are
provided by mass privatisation programmes in Czech and Slovak republics, or mass
privatisation with significant concessions to insiders in Russia. Yet in both Hungary and
Poland, privatisation was completed by a variety of methods leading to diversified
ownership and control structures.4 That makes these two countries an ideal ground for
testing hypotheses related to ownership and control structures. Moreover, as ownership
structures and company types were strongly affected by recent policy choices of
privatisation methods, they are less prone to the Demsetz-type critique (Demsetz and
Lehn 1985; Demsetz and Villalonga 2001). That is, the period of time since the
privatisation process was completed may be too short to establish some equilibrium on
the corporate control markets, where inefficient types of ownership structures are
eliminated, in which case one should not expect any systematic differences in
performance between different types of firms. Indeed, corporate control markets in
transition economies are far from this hypothetical equilibrium, as empirical studies
demonstrate consistent differences in performance between various ownership types
(see Djankov and Murell 2002 for an overview of empirical evidence).
Summarising, our choice of the two countries is motivated by the fact that they are both
characterised by diversity, not only in the available sources of finance, but also in terms
of ownership and corporate control structures. The latter characteristic is shared with
some other transition economies and makes Hungarian and Polish companies a
representative group of firms providing information necessary for exploring empirically
differences in the enterprise behaviour related to investment financing. 
3. The theoretical setting and empirical evidence on the determinants of access to
finance  
Financial constraints
The nature of the link between financing constraints and investment is a highly debated
issue in the literature on finance and investment. One strand of the literature shows that
high sensitivity and positive response of investment to cash flow can be interpreted as
evidence of financial constraints and demonstrates an empirical link with the likely
predictors of credit constraints. In particular, some researchers classify firms on the
basis of dividend-payout behaviour (Fazzari et al, 1988), association with banks or
business groups (Hoshi et al, 1991), ownership (Lizal and Svenjar 2002, among others)
and firm size (see Schiantarelli 1996 and Hubbard 1998 for reviews of all but most
recent literature). One seminal example of this approach is Bond and Meghir (1994),
who develop a model incorporating the hierarchy of finance, relying on both dividend
behaviour and issue of new shares. The investment behaviour of firms should differ
across different financial regimes. Bond and Meghir (1994) argue that the following two
types of companies may be identified as not being financially constrained: 
i. those that pay dividends, which indicates that they can generate abundant internal
funds in relation to perceived investment opportunities, and 
ii. the companies, which issue new stock to finance investment, i.e. have access to
capital market finance. 
                                                          
4 See Mickiewicz and Baltowski (2003) and Major (2003) for recent overviews of the Polish and
Hungarian privatisation programmes, correspondingly.
6In between those two categories, one observes the third category of companies, which
neither pay dividends nor finance new investment by issuing new shares. These
companies are liquidity constrained in the sense that ‘a windfall addition to current
earnings, which conveys no information about the firm’s future prospects, will result in
an increase in investment’ (Ibid, p.203). This group of firm may be characterised by
excess reliance on internal finance for investment. 
However, Kaplan and Zingales (1997 and 2000) and Cleary (1999) present empirical
evidence intended to demonstrate that the ‘investment-cash flow’ link is not a useful
measure of financial constraints, due to non-monotonicities. While their findings were
in turn questioned by Fazzari et al. (2000), the debate has yielded inconclusive results.
In particular, Kaplan and Zingales (2000) notice that some prominent companies, e.g.,
the likes of Microsoft, have high cash balances and avoid dividend payments, while
investment remain very sensitive to changes in available cash flows. They notice that
one explanation of this behaviour may relate to the so called ‘flypaper effect’, which is
discussed by Hines and Thaler (1995). According to the latter authors, while “the
distinction between having money on hand and being able to raise money without
difficulty should have no impact on spending decisions”, in practice, “when it comes to
predict the behaviour of governments, organisations and individuals, it is important to
distinguish between the resources they have on hand and resources they could easily
get” (Ibid., pp. 224-225). Correspondingly, a larger volume of cash flow may lead to
more investment. An explanation of this type of behaviour has also been offered by the
important strand of the literature originated by Jensen (1986), who proposed the “free
cash flow” approach. According to this, managers maximise objectives, which are not in
common with shareholders’ interests, with managers aiming to increase firm size, as
this boosts their pay, status and power. Thus the cash flows that are at the disposal of
managers after valuable/efficient investment is carried out, is “free cash flow”.
Managers may then still take on more investment projects at the expense of
shareholders, increasing firm size but at the cost of lower net present value.
Consequently cash flow and investment may be positively related and this may explain
the puzzling behaviour of firms like Microsoft.
Corporate control structures
If Jensen’s (1986) argument is correct, than the structures of corporate control should be
considered when examining empirically investment financing. The investment
behaviour may be affected because parameters of the firm’s objective function will vary
and also because differences in corporate control structures impact on efficiency of
aligning the objectives of insiders with those of providers of finance. Therefore, the
characteristics of corporate control structures and identity of owners may correspond to
the extent to which firms are hindered by information and incentive problems in capital
markets, and thus investment may have varying degrees of reliance on internal cash
flows.
7One important dimension of corporate control is ownership structure and concentration,
while a typical feature of Hungarian and Polish firms is highly concentrated ownership
structures. That follows from the characteristics of nascent capital markets and also can
be explained by the fact that protection of minority shareholders is still much less
adequate than in countries such as the US or the UK. Yet the effect of concentrated
ownership on access to finance may be ambiguous, as the providers of finance may
perceive positive effects of better monitoring, but on the other hand may see the
negative effects related to agency problems. The latter may arise, where, for
concentrated owners, the entrenchment effects outweigh the incentive effects (Jensen
and Meckling 1976). Empirical evidence documents that the resulting impact of
concentrated ownership may be non-monotonic (a classic study being Morck et al.
1988; for the overview of the issue in the transition economies context, see Filatotchev
and Mickiewicz 2001).
While characteristics both of firms and of institutional frameworks of capital markets
differ across transition economies, different control structures may emerge as a second-
best response to those conditions. One example of that relates to the degree of firms’
affiliation to wider industrial conglomerates. Hoshi et al. (1991) examine whether
liquidity is a more relevant determinant of investment for the Japanese firms, which are
affiliated to a keiretsu or industrial group with close links to banks, then for those firms,
which are independent of these alliances. Their main result shows that the liquidity
variable - cash flow5, is more important for the independent firms, than for the firms
affiliated to an industrial group and/or leading bank. Hall et al. (1998b) study the
determinants of investment in scientific firms for the US, France and Japan (1979-89)
and find that the links between investment, profit, sales and cash flow are idiosyncratic
and country-specific. In the US, investment is more sensitive to cash flow, as compared
to France or Japan. The authors argue that this observation reflects differences in
corporate governance structures, which appear country-specific. Firms in the US do not
enjoy close links with banks while Japanese firms do, so the cost of external finance
maybe higher, forcing firms to rely more on internal funds. Degrsye and de Jong (2000)
also hypothesise that corporate governance will affect investment expenditure. In
estimating an investment equation, they interact a cash flow variable with the measures
of corporate governance, such as board structure, ownership and bank relations. In their
analysis they find that firm-bank relations and the size of the largest shareholder have
no impact on investment. However, the size of insider equity increases the impact of
cash flow upon investment. Galindo and Schiantarelli (2002) provide an overview of
recent research on investment financing in Latin America, reporting evidence that firms
with foreign ownership are less restricted in their access to finance. The result may not
be general, as Colombo (2001) found no significant impact of foreign ownership on
access to short-term debt finance for Hungary. More recently, Harrison and McMillan
(2003), using a sample of firms taken from the Ivory Coast, demonstrate that foreign
companies are less credit constrained than domestic firms. Foreign ownership may be
conductive to easier access to finance not just because of direct funding from foreign
partners and greater availability of foreign sources of finance. Another reason may be
that firms with some degree of foreign ownership enjoy less bankruptcy risk, as they
adopt faster international standards on product quality and therefore find it easier to gain
access to domestic bank debt (Colombo 2001; Harrison and McMillan 2003).
                                                          
5 Measured in their study by net (after tax) income plus depreciation, less dividend payments.
8Firm size
Smaller companies may be constrained in their access to external finance (Keasey and
Watson, 1993; Jarvis, 2000). One possible explanation is that providers of finance incur
fixed costs of evaluating investment projects. This condition alone will be sufficient to
create a bias against smaller firms. Moreover, smaller firms tend to be subject to
idiosyncratic risk, being less likely to have developed a good reputation with investors,
as small firms are typically start-ups with no long credit history (Schiantarelli 1996;
Colombo and Driffill 2003). However empirical evidence is mixed and again, the
conclusions may be specific to particular countries or types of financial systems. Fazzari
et al. (1988) investigate the link between firm size and access to capital and argue that
in times of tight credit, small and medium-sized firms are often denied funds, in favour
of better quality borrowers (p153). Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) show that there is a
strong correlation between firm size and the scope for external financing: smaller firms
rely on intermediary finance, while larger firms are not restricted in their access to
capital markets. Using firm-level data for US manufacturing companies, Bernanke et al.
(1994) present strong empirical evidence that the severity of the agency cost problem
faced by firms depends on firm size. Lizar and Svejnar (2002) focus on enterprises in
Czech Republic and in attempting to control for size, split their sample into sub-samples
of large firms numbering 100 or more employees and of small firms with fewer that 100
employees. From this exercise they find evidence of credit rationing (i.e. a positive
relationship between profit and investment) only for smaller, private firms. In contrast,
larger firms in their sample have virtually unlimited access to capital implying a
negative relationship between profit and investment for their data. However, contrasting
results were obtained as well. For instance, Hu and Schiantarelli (1994) found that
ceteris paribus, size is positively associated with the probability of the firm being
financially constrained. Again, a possible explanation is that banks face a trade-off
between higher evaluation and preparation costs for multiple small and medium size
loans and higher risk resulting from a focus on smaller number of large projects. 
The literature also notes the agency problem of equity peculiar to closely held firms. As
already mentioned, information asymmetries make adequate monitoring of smaller
firms by lenders difficult, because when a company with limited liability becomes
financially distressed, equity takes on ‘call option’ characteristics (Black and Scholes,
1973; Merton, 1974). That might provide an incentive and opportunity for the
owners/insiders to misrepresent investment risks and returns and to take more riskier
actions than they would be willing to take in the absence of limited liability. 
To summarise, our reading of the literature is that, on balance, large firms should have
lower agency costs per unit of external finance because of their greater diversification,
longer track records, and because of economies of scale in collecting and processing
information about their situation. This gives rise to the agency problem in credit markets
for smaller firms who experience reduced access to credit relative to other borrowers.
Conclusions derived from this section
• Firms, which pay dividends and/or can rely in their investment finance on external
sources, may be considered as not being financially constrained.6
• The relation between concentration of ownership and access to finance may be
ambiguous, as the providers of finance may perceive positive effects of better
monitoring, but on the other hand also the negative effects related to agency
problems. 
                                                          
6 A word of caution. Even if the conclusion is fairly standard, it needs a qualification. Namely, due to
informational imperfections and the need for signalling, it might be that the firm ought to pay dividends
even at the expense of foregoing a positive NPV investment opportunity.
9• We expect that less financially constrained firms are those, which are affiliates of
foreign companies, which have close links with wider industrial structures, which
have a leading bank, and which are of larger size.
• A corollary of the previous conclusion: firms belonging to corporate alliances such
as foreign affiliates, affiliates of domestic industrial conglomerates, and enterprises
established close links with their leading bank can use a wider range of available
external finance sources to complement internally generated cash flows for
investment programmes. 
• It is likely that in some industry sectors companies with no access to these
alternative sources of finance tend to resort to state support.
4. The survey sample
Method of Collecting Survey Data  
In comparison with some other post-communist countries, especially the CIS
countries, company accessibility for conducting a survey-based academic research in
Poland and Hungary is relatively good, especially in the case of largest firms, which are
generally more accustomed to openness than smaller enterprises. However, we note two
problems. The first problem is the credibility of an investigator. Interview was the
method of collection of information in our survey where opinions of chief executives
regarding their firms’ access to finance were sought alongside factual information. For a
survey involving interviews where the desired information is likely to be divulged
reluctantly, the selection of trained, experienced and credible investigators is crucial for
obtaining the required data on firms and measuring attitudes of chief executive officers.
It was important to ensure that owners, managers and employees of a participating
company, trusted interviewers with information collected strictly for the purpose of
academic research. The companies contributed to the surveys have also been given
assurances as to complete anonymity in any form of the output resulting from the data
analysis. Our face-to-face questionnaire survey of Polish and Hungarian companies
involving interviews with the companies’ chief executive officers, was commissioned
and conducted in mid 2001, respectively by the Research Department of the Polish
Sociological Society (under supervision of the CASE Institute, Warsaw) and by the
Hungarian Academy of Science. The Polish partners, CASE and the research
department of the PSS, have extensive research experience in surveys at the company
level. The Research Department of the Polish Sociological Society conducted the whole
field phase of the survey study (training interviewer teams, collecting key company
information, interviewing the firms’ managers) as well as prepared initial data for
further analysis. The team has conducted dozens of national and regional polls in
companies of various legal types, industry sectors and ownership types. It has a stable
network of professional interviewers, which covers the whole country. They are well
aware of the situation in their regions, have huge experience of work with companies -
both state-owned and private - and employ a range of techniques necessary for gaining
entry into a company and gaining confidence of its personnel. In addition to
methodological background, they also possess good practical knowledge about intra-
company personal relations. Another strength of the team employed for conducting our
survey is a comprehensive system of control used by the investigators at every stage of
the survey. Extensive experience in conducting surveys ensures high quality of their
work. Similar assessments can be given to quality of the survey output provided by the
Institute of Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Science, a well-established
economic research institute in Hungary with strong expertise in field surveys and data
analysis.
The second problem is “sensitivity” of owners and managers of a company
towards the questions tapping the information regarded as “confidential” or non-
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permissible on the grounds of protecting the competitiveness of a company. The
questionnaire items which were initially seemed as being likely to evoke an adverse
reaction related to ownership and control structures including the distribution of insider
share-holdings; number of shares in the company held by interviewees; interviewees’
positions in the company hierarchy; interviewees’ participation in the Management
Council and Supervisory Board, and interviewees’ affiliations. Most reports dealing
with past experience on this type of survey questions suggests that up to 10-15% of
interviewees may refuse to co-operate and provide answers, irrespective of interviewer
skills. The non-response rate for our interview survey was in the similar ballpark and
can be considered satisfactory, however, item-non-response gave rise to the issue of
choosing the appropriate missing data treatments in a subsequent data analysis. Fewer
difficulties were encountered by our investigators in relation to the questionnaire part
dealing with financial performance and position of firms since, in both countries,
company reports are available to external parties and under the adopted regulations
large firms disclose sufficiently detailed accounting information which can be
considered reliable.
We note that item non-response due to confidentiality concerns did not occur in
our survey, as steps were taken to identify and eliminate possible sources of the problem
at the time of questionnaire design and preliminary testing. However, given the time
constraints of the interviewees, the missing answers arose due to the fact that some of
the information was not readily available. That especially relates to the ownership
dimension.
Care was also taken to obtain a sample representative of the population of large
companies. We defined the sample frame using the large company lists maintained by
the two reliable, published databases. For Poland, we employed the list of 500 largest
(in terms of sales) non-financial companies compiled by a team of Polish economists at
the Institute of Economics of the Polish Academy of Sciences and published by the
„Rzeczpospolita”, a top broad-sheet newspaper, which covers finance and business law
issues. A smaller database of large companies is available for Hungary, which reflects
the fact that Hungary has fewer large firms. The list of the 200 largest companies is
published annually by the ‘Figyelo’ magazine. These two lists representing the two
countries were pooled together, producing a sample frame that was used to select the
firms for the survey at random. At the first stage of the Polish survey, 84 questionnaires
were completed,7 and questionnaires on further 16 companies were obtained during the
second stage after additional sampling. The survey of Hungarian companies generated
57 usable questionnaires, yielding the total sample size of 157 firms. The survey results
were additionally checked via re-sampling by using a sample of questions from the set
of surveyed companies (10 companies for Poland and 5 companies for Hungary). No
inconsistencies in answers have been detected.
The questionnaire8 opens with the questions concerned with the key company
characteristics, including sectoral affiliation, legal status, and date of privatisation
(Section A). Section B contains questions designed to measure a number of
performance and financial position variables for three years prior to the survey (i.e. for
1998-2000). Section C deals with questions on finance. In section D we asked questions
on employment, wage setting and industrial relations. Section E relates to
internationalisation and market structures. Section F covers the areas of corporate
governance and ownership structure. The points covered in this section of the
questionnaire and in the sections dealing with finance and performance provide the
information with which we investigate the issue of access to finance in this paper.
                                                          
7 Descriptive discussion of  the results from this part of the survey is provided by Kozarzewski (2002).
8 The questionnaire is available on request from the authors.
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A Description of the Sample and Coverage of the Questionnaire
Definitions of variables and their descriptive statistics are presented in Tables 1-2.
95% of companies are drawn from the manufacturing sector, with 5% being in either
services or construction. The cross-sector boundaries tend to be blurred as a trend
towards changing affiliation from manufacturing to services is generally observed since
the liberalisation / transition programme was introduced at the beginning of the 1990s.
Some of the sample firms are active in both manufacturing and services (trade in
particular). Median employment values are 596 for Poland and 542 for Hungary, but the
distributions are skewed due to the presence of few very large companies, especially in
the Hungarian sub-sample, where the largest company had 15599 employees at the end
of 2000. For that reason the mean employment values are higher than the medians for
both sub-samples, being 907 for Poland and 1403 for Hungary. Distributions of two
alternative measures of size – assets and total revenues – follow a similar pattern, with
the median values being higher for Poland than for Hungary, while the opposite is true
for the means. Based on the full sample, in 2000, the median value of total revenues was
US$37.7 million while the median value of total assets was US$26.4 million. The data
on asset size should be interpreted with caution, as it represents book values.
We grouped owners into three categories: foreign investors, domestic institutional
investors and private individuals (the latter group including both insiders - managers
and employees - and outsiders). From the corporate control perspective, there should be
a significant difference in behaviour between insiders and outsiders, both because
objectives may differ (esp. presence of wages and employment in the utility function)
but also due to the possible entrenchment effects on one side, and some productivity
incentives on the other. Indeed, the difference is important when we compare de novo
firms with privatised enterprises. It is the first group of de novo firms where individual
private owners play an important governance role as entrepreneurs and founders of the
firms, and typically retain important stakes in share ownership. Yet, the distinction
between insider and outsider individual owners is far more blurred in the group of
privatised companies from which our sample was drawn. The problem relates to the fact
that in privatised companies, external individual owners are frequently either former
employees or persons related to employees. For quoted firms, an important distinctive
group is that of individual shareholders, who bought their shares on the stock exchange.
Yet for this group it is difficult to identify the proportions of shares held respectively by
employees and by outsiders. For that reason we employ an inevitably heterogeneous
aggregate category of ‘individual owners’. The composition of ownership is best
illustrated by distinguishing between the different types of the largest shareholder.
Surprisingly, very similar distributions were found both for Hungary and for Poland,
with differences between the two sub-samples being within a range of one percentage
point. Thus, for the full sample, 46.3% of firms have foreign owners as the largest
category of shareholders, 31.4% domestic institutional investors and 22.3% individual
shareholders. In addition to the question about the largest shareholder category, we
asked about the presence of a foreign partner as an investor, as this may be important
regardless of the shareholding composition. Here, the differences between the two sub-
samples are more pronounced, as 68.4% of Hungarian firms declare a presence of a
foreign partner as compared with 59.0% for the Polish sub-sample. The category “the
dominant owner being a foreign investor” is a subgroup within “the presence of foreign
partner” category. In model specifications presented in Section 6, we take the presence
of foreign partner as our choice variable. As will be explored, this variable has a
significant impact on financing patterns.
The second corporate control dimension we take account for in modelling relates to
concentration of shares, irrespective of ownership category. Respondents were asked
about the proportion of shares held by the largest owner. It turned out that in our survey
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sample of largest companies, the level of share-ownership concentration was high. In
Hungary, the dominant owner controlled on average 69.8% of shares and for Polish
firms the corresponding figure was 58.8%.
We constructed two measures of financial performance and position, which are
presented in Table 1. The first variable measures profitability as the ratio of earnings
before taxes (but after financing expenses) to total revenues. Profitability distributions
are skewed due to a small number of companies reporting high profitability. In
particular, in 1988-2000, Hungarian companies reported higher profits than Polish
firms, with median values being correspondingly 1.51% and 0.26%. A significant
number of large Polish companies reported losses in 2000. The second financial
variable is a measure of overall indebtedness. As no balance sheet data allowing to
separate out long- and short-term debt obligations was available, we use a rather crude
proxy represented by the ratio of total liabilities over total assets, with both components
of the ratio being recorded at book values. While median values for both sub-samples
are very similar, the mean values aren’t, as the mean value for Hungarian firms is much
smaller than the median value due to the presence of several firms with relatively small
levels of debt. The median value for the whole sample is 56.1% (57.4% for Hungary
and 54.7% for Poland).
We were also interested in two other dimensions of company behaviour connected with
financing decisions of firms. Following the literature, dividend payments may indicate a
category of firms, which were not financially constrained. In this respect, large
Hungarian companies behave differently from large Polish large firms, specifically,
68.0% of Hungarian companies paid dividends in 2000, while only 18.9% of Polish
firms made dividend payments in this year. 
Last but not least, our main focus is on investigating investment financing and
measuring financing constraints. Our proposed first (‘direct’) measure of financial
constraint is based on the answers to the following two questions:
11. What is the company's estimate of the total cost of the modernisation investment over the next five
years), required to achieve the strategic targets?
12. What you expect to be a realistic level of modernisation investment over the next five years?
Essentially, Question 11 asked about the desired level of investment funds and
Question 12 about the expected realistic (obtainable) level of finance for
investment. We interpret the cases where the latter is lower than the former as an
indicator of constraints in investment. Interestingly, using this measure we may find
that majority of companies in both countries were constrained in possibility of
implementing their investment projects, while percentages are similar, 60.5% for
Hungary and 54.9% for Poland.
The questionnaire went on to ask Question 13, a close-ended question on the
opinions of the firms’ chief executives regarding availability (accessibility in the
future) of various sources of financing for their investment programmes. A common
7-point scale was used to describe managers’ assessment of nine forms of finance
(this fragment of the questionnaire is shown below). Answers to this question
enable us to create ordinal variables reflecting the importance of major forms of
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finance and to construct an additional binary indicator of financial constraints to
supplement the ‘direct’ measure of constraints defined above.
13. If you intend to raise all/some of the above sum of finance, what are the likely most important
sources (score each factor as follows: 1 = low importance, 7 = high importance):
Selling/leasing your buildings and
equipment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Selling shareholding in other companies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Retained earnings (profits) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Credits from local banks 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Credits from foreign banks 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Credits from industrial partners 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
State financial support 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Issue of equity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Issue of bonds 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Interestingly, the overall pattern of relative importance of finance sources for the sample
companies in both countries turned out to be very similar, retained earnings followed by
credit from domestic banks were ranked as the two most important sources of finance
for investment9. For both sub-samples, those are the only two categories, where median
values are different from 1 (where 1 represents ‘not important’). Looking at the mean
values, we can also see the ranking of other alternative sources of finance. Again, these
are very similar for both countries, with only two cases, where some sources of finance
swap places respectively. For both countries the third most important source of finance
is sell-off of assets, which indicates that privatised companies are actively seeking to
restructure and overcome the legacy of asset composition inherited from the previous
period. Next comes credit from foreign banks and state support for investment,
presumably under industry branch restructuring programmes. A somewhat less
important role is played by equity issues and financial restructuring via sell-off of
shareholdings in other companies. The two least important sources of finance are issue
of corporate bonds and direct finance from industrial partners.
As expected, retained earnings appear to be a most important source of financing for
investment. Following the literature discussed above, we interpret the reliance on
retained earnings as a second (‘indirect’) indicator of constrained finance.
And finally, as mentioned above we also combine information from the answers to the
questions on financing modes to construct our third (‘indirect’) measure of financial
constraints. We define firms as being financially constrained if both of the following
two conditions are satisfied. First, the scores in the internal categories of finance
(retained earnings, sell-offs of assets and shareholdings) and/or state support should be
greater than the ratings the firm’s chief executive assigned to the forms of external
financing (the remaining five categories of finance, as enumerated above). The second
condition is non-payment (omission) of dividends in 2000.
In sum, we employ in modelling three measures of financing constraints on investment. 
                                                          
9 This finding seems consistent with the pecking order theory of capital structure (see, e.g., Myers, 1984). 
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Firstly, we use a ‘direct’ measure, based on expectations of chief executives related to
possibility of implementing desired investment programme in full.
Secondly, we use the importance of retained earnings for overall finance.
Thirdly, we use a composite measure, where constrained firms are defined as those for
whom internal sources of finance dominate external financing, and they do not pay
dividends. The last two indicators may be labelled ‘indirect’ measures.
5. The Statistical model
Categorical Response Types
The data set created with responses to closed-ended survey questions, makes it possible
to investigate perceptions of chief executive officers of large privatised Hungarian and
Polish industrial companies, towards a range of finance sources likely to be available for
modernisation programmes planned by their firms. We analyse the role of funds, which
can be generated internally, by investigating separately retained profits and finance that
can be raised by selling stakes in other firms and by selling or leasing buildings and
equipment to other enterprises. In addition we consider the potential relevance to
modernisation programmes of sources providing companies with new long- and short-
term finance obtained via issues of equity and corporate bonds, borrowings from
domestic and foreign banks, support from the state, and credit from industrial partners.
The survey information also represents managers’ judgements both about the level of
capital expenditure desired and necessary to achieve the firm’s strategic objectives and
about the realistic estimates of internal and external finance potentially available to the
firm. This particular dimension of the questionnaire survey enables us to propose and
construct the direct measure of financing constraints likely to be experienced by the
firms in implementing their desirable investment programmes. 
It is important to note at this juncture that responses to the survey allow us to construct
ordinal categorical and binary response variables for regression modelling of access to
finance. Specifically, we utilise ‘assessed’ or ‘judged’10 ordinal 7-level11 categorical
variables generated by managers who possess an indeterminate amount of information
before providing their judgements regarding the importance of a particular finance
source, and binary indicators created with the survey information to capture the
presence/absence of financing constraints. For both types of categorical responses we
use parametric analysis based on the family of logistic distributions. In this study we
employ separate regression models linking a response variable, y, with a set of predictor
or explanatory variables x, underlying managers’ opinions and associated with a
possibility of financial constraints. The set of predictor variables includes firm-level
characteristics that reflect asset size, profitability, indebtedness, ownership structure and
concentration as well as controls for activity sector and economy-wide differences.  
Bayesian Inference and the Proportional Odds Model for Ordinal Response
In this study, inference summarising opinions of chief executive officers is done using
the Bayesian approach for analysing the interview survey data. A fundamental strength
of Bayesian modelling is that posterior parameter estimates are assumed to have a
distribution and therefore give more realistic picture of uncertainty. Other natural
advantages over classical inference include: (i) avoiding the assumption of infinite
amounts of forthcoming data; (ii) the potential for handling missing values as part of the
estimation process; (iii) a direct interpretation of posterior credible intervals for model
                                                          
10 See Anderson (1984) for a relevant discussion of the major types of observed ordinal categorical variables. 
11 As discussed above, managers were asked to indicate how important a source will be for financing modernization,
on a 7-point rating scale with end-points labelled low importance (1) and high importance (7).   
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parameters and (iv) finite sample results (Congdon, 2003; Gill, 2002). The Bayesian
approach is based on updating previous knowledge about the distribution of some
unknown quantity. In classical inference, the sample data are taken as random while
population parameters are taken as fixed, while Bayesians make no fundamental
distinction between the sample data, missing values and unknown model parameters,
both these quantities are treated as random variables as a logical consequence of
Bayesian conditional analysis. In Bayesian analysis, model parameters θ follow a
probability distribution, knowledge of which is summarised in a prior distribution π(θ).
The likelihood of the observed data y given parameters θ, denoted L(θ|y) , is used to
modify the prior beliefs π(θ), with the update knowledge summarised in a posterior
distribution, π(θ|y) (for details see, e.g., Congdon, 2003). The updated beliefs are a
function of prior knowledge and the sample data evidence: 
An important feature of this model, which backs up its use for our analysis of survey
data on Hungarian and Polish companies, is that in the Bayesian context, missing values
are treated as another set of unknown quantities. As discussed in Section 4, our survey
data contain missing values resulting from the failure to obtain answers to some
individual items, however we should note that the incomplete data problem is not acute
with average item non-response rates in order of 10-15%. Simply omitting companies
with missing values from the analysis leads to valid inferences only if data are missing
completely at random, that is the missing data values are a simple random sample of all
data values. A less restrictive assumption, employed for our models, is that of
missingness at random under which the probability that an observation is missing
depends on the observed data but not on missing data. The data are missing at random if
the missingness on one question is conditionally independent of the outcome on that
question that would have been observed, given the observed responses to other
questions (Congdon, 2003). The treatment of missing values involves the definition of
what the data should be expected to look like given a specific probabilistic function
conditional on unknown variable values. In generating samples from the posterior
distribution we apply Gibbs sampling, a Markov chain Monte Carlo method (Gilks,
Richardson, Spiegelhalter,1996). Posterior distributions are summarised in terms of
means and credible intervals for regression coefficients of independent variables.
  
For modelling a multilevel ordinal outcome, we assume the proportional odds model
with a latent (continuous) variable y underlying the ordered categories (discussions of
the model can be found in McCullagh, 1980; Anderson, 1994; Agresti, 1996; Congdon,
2003).
Suppose the states are ranked from 1 (least important) to J (most important), with
cutpoints θj  from the continuous scale describing the transition from one category to the
next. 
If J (the number of levels) is equal to 7 (and this is the case with the observed in the
survey ordinal responses), there are 6 cutpoints. It is usually assumed that there are
additional start and end points to the underlying scale 
Then θj (j=1,6) are free ancillary parameters to estimate, subject to the constraint
(2)                                                .,  assuch   and 7070 +∞=−∞= θθθθ
(1)                                              )()|()|( θπθθπ yLy ∝
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The probability Pij that the chief executive officer of an individual firm i will articulate
the importance of the source of finance as j is then the same as the chance that the firm’s
underlying score is between θj-1 , θj
The cumulative probability γij that firm i with latent score Yi will rank the importance of
the source of finance as j or below is 
We can write the chance of managers articulating a specific category as j as
The proportional-odds model uses the logit as a link function for γij 
Note that model (6) assumes parallel/identical effects of covariates for all J-1 collapsing
of the response into the binary outcome. Hence β does not have a subscript. In model
(6), the negative sign on µi ensures that larger values of β′x lead to an increased chance
of belonging to the higher category.
We fit nine separate univariate proportional-odds models. The dependent ordinal
variables measure importance of: (1) retained profits, finance that can be raised by (2)
selling investments in other firms, funds generated by (3) selling or leasing buildings
and equipment to other enterprises, (4) equity and (5) bond finance, (6) borrowings from
domestic and (7) foreign banks, (8) support from the state, and (9) credit from industrial
partners12. 
In addition, we fit a standard logistic regression for the two binary indicators13 of
financial constraints in terms of observed predictors x:
In our study of finance sources accessible to a large privatised firm in a transition
economy, previous substantive knowledge about model parameter distributions is not
                                                          
12 The description of the nine ordinal indicators FINRET, FINSHR, FINSALE, FINEQ, FINBOND,
FINCRED, FINFOR, FINSTRAT and FININD can be seen in Table 1.
13 The description of the two binary indicators UNC_FIN and UN_FI_IN can be found in Table 1.
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summarised and may be assumed non-existent. Therefore to reflect prior ignorance we
resort to the strategy of non-informative priors. 
In all the models presented in Section 6, β and α are assigned vague normal priors with
zero means and large variances for letting the survey sample data to dominate the form
of the posterior distribution. 
6. Results
The output of the Gibbs sampler is presented in Tables 3a-3c below. The posterior
distributions of regression coefficients are summarised in terms of their means and 95%
Bayes credible intervals. In each of the models shown in Tables 3a-3c, inference is
based on the last 5,000 Gibbs samples with a 5,000 burn-in.      
When we take financing from retained earnings as an ordinal indicator of financial
constrains (FINRET in Table 3b), a clear pattern emerges. Ranked in order of
magnitude, we have the following four effects. 
Firstly, concentrated ownership is likely to result in better access to finance. As the
concentration variable distribution was highly non-normal, we discretise this variable
and use four categories, taking 25%, 50% and 75% as cut-off points and using the
lowest category (dispersed ownership) as the baseline (reference) category. The mean
effects of the two highest categories are negatively signed, with two of them being
significant. Dispersed ownership is clearly associated with reliance on retained earnings,
which suggests that from the financing point of view, benefits from concentrated
ownership control clearly out-weight the costs associated with potential agency
problem.
Secondly, having domestic institutional investor as a major shareholder helps to
overcome financial constraints. 
Thirdly, firms with foreign partners are also characterised by weaker financial
constraints.
And finally, Polish firms seem to be relying less on retained earnings than their
Hungarian counterparts.
We note that past profitability enters model with a positive sign, however, the credible
interval contains zero. One possible explanation for this finding is that past profitability
impacts upon availability of this mode of finance in two different ways. On the one
hand, higher profitability may lead to accumulation of retained earnings (assuming that
they are not distributed to shareholders), but on the other hand, good profitability
records should facilitate the firm’s access to the alternative external sources of finance.
The results for our second measure of financial constraint, a binary indicator,
(UN_FI_IN in Table 3c) are consistent with the first one, albeit less pronounced. Note
that in interpreting the direction of the effect, the positive signs correspond to negative
signs on the previous measure, FINRET. This is because we define this second variable
as (indirect) measure of unconstrained finance, a situation, where external sources of
finance are more important than internal and/or dividend payments are present. All the
three corporate control variables have expected sign, being consistent with the
coefficient sign pattern observed for the previous variable, although this time the only
significant indicator of the absence of financial constraints is dominant ownership of
domestic institutional investors.
In contrast, modelling unconstrained financing with our third measure, which is
represented as a binary dependent variable recording that the level of expected
obtainable investment is not lower than the expected level of desired investment
(UNC_FIN in Table 3c), is dominated by two dimensions: sectoral controls and past
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profitability. Firms in heavy industry (the baseline or reference category for sectoral
controls) are more likely to be unable to implement their investment programmes, as
one would expect. Furthermore, higher levels of past profitability result in lower
constraints in investment, again as could be expected. For this measure, the corporate
control variables are all insignificant.
Our results on the three measures of unconstrained finance are further corroborated by
results from proportional odds models for alternative modes of finance. This enables us
to see the alternative channels of financing, where different structures of corporate
control and different firm characteristics determine different ways of overcoming
financial constraints. We restrict ourselves only to those relationships, which turned out
to be statistically significant (Tables 3a – 3c).
Firstly, it is clear that institutional domestic investors have some owner-specific
advantage in using internal restructuring as a strategy for financing new investment.
Companies, which have institutional domestic investors as dominant owners, are most
likely to rely in their financing strategies on sell-offs both of assets and of stakes in
other companies (FINSALE and FINSHR). Another effect we register for this category
of dominant owners is that they may in the future rely more heavily on bond issues
(FINBOND).
Secondly, the financing strategy of companies with foreign partners is clearly different.
Along the financing dimensions represented in the specifications, the mean effects are
better defined in the models where the coefficient for the variable capturing the
presence of a foreign partner is negatively signed. Clearly, companies with foreign
partners seem unlikely to rely on issue of bonds (FINBOND) and equity (FINEQ),
albeit this second effect is insignificant. That is consistent with a popular belief that
domestic capital markets are less important for foreign affiliates. Also, companies with
foreign involvement are unlikely to rely on government-sponsored finance
(FINSTRAT). Finally, in a sharp contrast to the firms with the prevalence of domestic
institutional owners, privatised companies with foreign involvement are unlikely to rely
on sell-offs on assets (FINSALE) in their financing strategies.
Thirdly, we found two effects for the firms with concentrated ownership. Interestingly,
there seems to be a non-monotonic effect in relation to investment financing by equity
issues (FINEQ). This financing option is most probable for companies where 25-49% of
shares are held by the dominant owner. It seems that companies with most dispersed
ownership may not be perceived as attractive by the capital market, and this has a
negative affect on their access to equity finance. At the other end of the spectrum,
companies with high levels of concentrated ownership may not need to use the capital
market. Yet, in the case of the largest companies, the mode of finance may differ
according to the identity of the dominant owners and is better captured by the relevant
variables defined above.
We also found some additional miscellaneous significant effects worth mentioning. 
While links with a leading bank turned out to be insignificant for our measures of
unconstrained finance, this characteristic is a significant determinant of specific
financing sources. Interestingly, it is positively associated with financing supplied by
industrial partners (FININD). It indicates that the existing in the two countries industrial
groupings are indeed of industrial and financial nature and the two network elements
may have strong complementarity. In addition, as could be expected, links with a
leading bank seem to facilitate raising investment finance by issuing corporate bonds
(FINBOND). Generally, one can speculate, that the presence of a leading bank may
have a beneficial signalling effect for other providers of finance, while the bank may
perform some monitoring functions, alleviating basic agency problems.
19
High levels of past profitability turn out to be a significant predictor in two cases. First,
it is negatively associated with sell-offs both of assets and of shareholdings as a
financing strategy (FINSALE and FINSHR). It suggests that both financing policies are
triggered more by ‘push’ factors than by ‘pull’ factors. This is corroborated by the result
for domestic credit (FINCRED), which for all the companies tend to be the most
important, alternative to retained earnings source of finance (Tables 2a and 2b). And in
the case of domestic credit, firms with high levels of past profits clearly enjoy most easy
access (Table 3a).
Interestingly, our results suggest a strong firm size effect on the possible availability of
domestic credit. Within the sample range, a non-linear component with a positive sign
dominates over a linear one with a negative sign. Thus, we may conclude, that the size
of the firm has a positive, albeit non-linear effect on access to credit, much in line with
the existing literature.
The ratio of debt to total assets employed here is significant for two types of external
finance. Firms with high level of debt financing tend to seek new finance from
industrial partners (FININD), which may suggest that the ‘push’ rather then ‘pull’ effect
is operating here. Similarly, they are more likely to seek finance from foreign banks
(FINFOR), which may suggest a pecking order, where firms with lower levels of
indebtedness believe that they will utilise sources of domestic credit first.
Sectoral differences, represented by control dummies, matter in some cases. Firms in
heavy industry are most constrained when the degree of financing constraints is judged
by the ratio of expected to desired investment spending. Most effects of other industry
sectors are less certain, as posterior distributions include zero. One interesting exception
is ITECH (firms in high and middle technology sectors). Here, reliance on retained
earning is less likely, which may be consistent with intuitive explanations. As those
sectors are expected both to expand and innovate; we may predict the retained earnings
to be an insufficient source of funding, and this is consistent with the estimated effects.
Another significant effect relates to sectoral rankings in relation to use of domestic
credit. Here, the coefficient for high/middle technology sector is lowest (negative),
which is again consistent with less reliance on fixed claims funding in the high growth /
high innovation sector. While coefficient for this sector is insignificant in this case, it
can be compared with other sectors, where it is positive and significant. In particular,
reliance on bank credit is most typical for the service sector firms.
 
Finally, we found differences between Polish and Hungarian companies significant in
some cases. Polish companies are more likely to rely on finance from industrial partners
in their investment programmes (FININD). They are also more likely to rely on sell-offs
of assets (FINSALE) and similarly on selling their stakes in other firms (FINSHR, albeit
this latter effect is insignificant). On the other hand, they are less likely to expect
government-sponsored finance (FINSTRAT) for their investment programmes.
Conclusions
We believe that the three measures of financial constraints applied in this empirical
investigation produced meaningful results. Estimations for the two ‘indirect’ measures
reveal effects and relationships which are consistent with the stylised facts about finance
in the countries, where financial systems are not yet fully developed, and enrich these
stylised facts by adding a few additional details related to the impact of corporate
control dimensions. We find that the foreign companies, firms that are part of domestic
industrial groups and enterprises with concentrated ownership are all less constrained in
their access to finance. Interestingly, modelling results for the third, ‘direct’ measure of
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constraints in investment suggest the dominant role of sectoral differences. In particular,
it is clear that firms in heavy industry may encounter particular difficulties in their
access to finance. This may not necessary imply an inefficient outcome, as the capital
market valuation of investment projects may differ from assessments coming from the
chief executives and the former may simply be more realistic. As the heavy industry
Sector is typically more prone to soft budget constraint (Driffill and Mickiewicz 2003);
signs of restrictions in investment finance may not be a bad outcome.
Aside from that, application of survey instruments enabled us to identify alternative
modes of finance, as both different corporate control structures and past performance
records influence the sample firms' choice of finance source. In particular, access to
domestic credit is positively associated with company size and past profitability.
Industrial group members tend to favour bond issues as well as sells-offs of assets as
appropriate types of finance for their investment programmes. Preferences for raising
finance in the form of equity are associated with share concentration in a non-
monotonic way, being most prevalent in those companies where the dominant owner
holds 25-49% of shares. Close links with a leading bank not only increase the
possibility of bond issues but also appear to facilitate access to non-banking sources of
funds, in particular, to finance supplied by industrial partners. Finally, reliance on state
finance is less likely for the companies whose profiles resemble the case of
unconstrained finance, namely, for companies with foreign partners, companies that are
part of domestic industrial groups and companies with a strategic investor. Model
implications also include that the use of state funds is less likely for Polish than for
Hungarian companies.
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Table 1. Description of variables
Variable Explanation
Financial variables:
SALE_2000 Sale revenue in US$ million in 2000
EBT_SALE_2000 Earnings before taxes (‘gross profit’) dived by sale revenue, in percentages,
in 2000
EBT_SALE_(AVER) Earnings before taxes (‘gross profit’) dived by sale revenue, in percentages,
1998-2000 average
ASSET_SIZE_2000 Total assets measured in US$ million in 2000
ASSET_SIZE_2000_SQ Total assets measured in US$ million in 2000, squared
DEBT_2000 debt to total assets ratio calculated as (assets minus equity)/assets, in 2000
POSDIV_2000 positive dividend payments in 2000, dummy variable
EMPLOYMENT_2000 employment, as of 31 December 2000
Corporate control variables:
LSP Percentage of  shares of held by the largest shareholder
DINS largest shareholder = domestic institutional investor (industrial company or
financial institution), a dummy variable
FINS Largest shareholder = foreign investor
IND Largest shareholder = individuals (outsiders and insiders)
LEADBANK One or two leading banks, a dummy variable
FOREIGN Presence of foreign investor
Industry dummies:
IHEAV Heavy industry (ISIC: <14 and 27)
ILAB Labour intensive industry (ISIC: 15-20 and 36)
IRES Resource intensive industry (ISIC: 21-26)
ITECH Medium and high technology industry (ISIC: 28-35)
ISERVICES Services and construction (ISIC: 45, 50-52, >55)
Importance of a source of finance (Linker scale, 1-7; 7 – high importance)
FINSALE sale of assets
FINSHR Sale of shareholdings in other companies
FINRET Retained earnings
FINCRED Credit – domestic
FINFOR Credit – foreign
FININD Credit from industrial partners
FINSTRAT State support
FINEQ Issue of equity
FINBOND Issue of bonds
Measures of financial constraints:
IVT Desired level of modernisation investment expenditure over 5y
RIVT Expected (realistic) level of modernisation investment expenditure over 5y
UNC_FIN equals: 
0 if ivt>rivt, and
1 if ivt=rivt (unconstrained access to finance)
UN_FI_IN Unconstrained finance – indirect measure:
0=firms, for which internal sources of finance (FINSALE, FINSHR, FINRET)
and FINSTRAT are more important than external financing and they did not
pay dividends (i.e. there was no information about dividend payments in
2000)
1=otherwise
Table 2a. Descriptive statistics - means and standard deviations
All firms Poland Hungary
 variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Obs Mean Std.Dev. Obs Mean Std.Dev.
dins 121 .314 .466 80 .312 .466 41 .317 .471
fins 121 .463 .501 80 .462 .501 41 .463 .505
ind 121 .223 .418 80 .225 420 41 .220 .419
foreign 157 .624 .486 100 .590 .494 57 .684 .469
lead 135 .200 .401 93 .226 .420 42 .143 .354
lsp 122 62.46 32.60 81 58.77 33.81 41 69.76 29.09
asset_size_2000 126 42.79 58.75 91 38.92 49.17 35 52.86 78.39
sale_2000 143 65.45 84.73 98 58.47 69.17 45 80.65 110.81
ebt_sale_2000 129 2.16 8.826 90 .90 8.98 39 5.08 7.80
debt2000 125 .524 .397 90 .556 .277 35 .442 .605
posdiv_2000 115 .296 .468 90 .189 .394 25 .680 .476
employment_2000 137 1063 1771 94 907 857 43 1404 2891
iheav 152 .053 .224 95 .021 .144 57 .105 .310
ilab 152 .362 .482 95 .379 .488 57 .333 .476
ires 152 .211 .409 95 .189 .394 57 .246 .434
iservices 152 .053 .224 95 .084 .279 57 .000 .000
itech 152 .336 .474 95 .337 .475 57 .333 .476
finsale 142 2.29 1.81 93 2.24 1.76 49 2.37 1.91
finshr 141 1.66 1.47 92 1.57 1.29 49 1.84 1.76
finret 142 5.15 1.92 92 5.37 1.85 50 4.76 2.00
fincred 142 4.17 2.11 93 4.34 2.14 49 3.84 2.03
finfor 142 2.01 1.75 92 1.87 1.65 50 2.26 1.91
finind 141 1.45 1.23 92 1.51 1.32 49 1.35 1.03
finstrat 141 2.01 1.72 92 1.88 1.70 49 2.24 1.75
fineq 138 1.89 1.62 90 1.76 1.36 48 2.15 2.01
finbond 138 1.40 1.16 89 1.35 1.11 49 1.49 1.26
un_fi_in 143 .671 .471 97 .691 .465 46 .630 .488
unc_fin 125 .432 .497 82 .451 .501 43 .395 .495
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Table 2b. Descriptive statistics - medians (excluding control dummies)
All firms Poland Hungary
 variable Obs Median 95% Conf. Interval Obs Median 95% Conf. Interval Obs Median 95% Conf. Interval
lsp 122 63.1 51.5 75.9 81 60.0 49.4 73.9 41 77.0 57.7 96.2
asset_size_2000 126 26.4 21.0 29.9 91 23.5 16.7 28.5 35 36.2 26.5 44.4
sale_2000 143 37.7 32.0 45.1 98 31.0 25.9 44.0 45 45.1 36.9 52.9
ebt_sale_2000 129 .797 .355 1.114 90 .259 .126 .761 39 1.513 .987 5.173
debt_2000 125 .561 .467 .595 90 .547 .447 .600 35 .574 .474 .689
employment_2000 137 595 527 707 94 596 529 745 43 542 438 762
finsale 142 1 1 2 93 1 1 2 49 1 1 2
finshr 141 1 1 1 92 1 1 1 49 1 1 1
finret 142 6 5 6 92 6 5 6 50 5 4 6
fincred 142 4 4 5 93 4 4 6 49 4 3 5
finfor 142 1 1 1 92 1 1 1 50 1 1 2
finind 141 1 1 1 92 1 1 1 49 1 1 1
finstrat 141 1 1 1 92 1 1 1 49 1 1 2
fineq 138 1 1 1 90 1 1 1 48 1 1 1
finbond 138 1 1 1 89 1 1 1 49 1 1 1
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Table 3a. Estimation results
Proportional Odds Model Proportional Odds Model Proportional Odds Model Proportional Odds Model
finbond fincred fineq finfor
  Mean
95% Bayes
Credible interval  Mean
95% Bayes
Credible interval  Mean
95% Bayes
Credible interval  Mean
95% Bayes
Credible interval
Independent Variables
asset_size_2000 0.726 -0.315 1.677 -0.727 -1.556 0.008 -0.128 -1.087 0.908 0.447 -0.567 1.310
asset_size_2000_sq 0.001 -0.789 0.935 0.873 0.086 1.731 0.499 -0.408 1.364 -0.480 -1.414 0.481
dins 3.034 1.037 5.074 0.939 -0.054 1.875 -0.441 -1.633 0.853 -0.553 -2.039 0.991
foreign -2.078 -3.882 -0.473 0.094 -0.795 0.933 -0.566 -1.531 0.322 0.736 -0.458 1.867
debt_2000 0.003 -0.033 0.040 0.003 -0.030 0.038 -0.007 -0.035 0.023 0.065 0.024 0.156
ilab 0.842 -1.615 3.468 1.390 0.096 2.964 0.338 -1.532 2.474 -1.248 -3.838 1.040
ires 1.040 -1.332 3.765 1.586 0.258 3.159 -0.422 -2.155 1.626 0.686 -1.871 2.862
iservices 1.859 -2.218 5.426 2.480 0.487 4.935 -0.763 -3.479 2.167 -0.335 -4.291 2.927
itech 0.763 -1.642 3.412 0.472 -0.736 1.957 1.479 -0.285 3.403 -0.452 -2.950 1.793
lead 2.585 0.558 4.552 0.020 -1.038 1.108 0.918 -0.160 1.933 -0.232 -1.437 0.948
lsp[2] 25-49% 0.358 -1.169 1.779 -0.141 -1.203 0.885 1.641 0.516 2.811 0.251 -1.079 1.510
lsp[3] 50-74% 0.121 -1.294 1.585 0.216 -0.913 1.377 -0.151 -1.550 1.211 -0.737 -2.084 0.477
lsp[4] 75-100% 1.258 -0.088 2.718 0.478 -0.478 1.437 -0.304 -1.326 0.733 0.183 -1.008 1.466
poland 0.467 -1.157 2.307 0.012 -0.757 0.837 0.679 -0.472 1.915 0.313 -0.808 1.428
ebt_sale_(aver)_[2] 0.457 -0.860 1.738 0.557 -0.304 1.421 -0.069 -1.084 0.801 0.200 -0.960 1.416
ebt_sale_(aver)_[3] -0.897 -2.345 0.534 1.111 0.294 1.962 -0.135 -1.287 0.843 0.164 -0.864 1.290
ebt_sale_(aver)_[4] -0.064 -1.499 1.340 0.384 -0.636 1.342 -0.185 -1.489 1.105 1.084 -0.027 2.231
Cut points
theta[1] 5.577 3.071 8.054 0.446 -0.657 2.410 1.950 0.567 3.623 1.129 -2.309 4.552
theta[2] 6.158 3.734 8.625 0.949 -0.142 2.873 2.395 0.997 4.092 1.678 -1.741 5.072
theta[3] 7.242 4.606 9.678 1.693 0.496 3.573 3.245 1.865 4.898 2.313 -1.103 5.669
theta[4] 8.160 5.689 10.520 2.425 1.247 4.335 4.113 2.689 5.785 3.392 -0.048 6.807
theta[5] 8.453 5.920 10.830 3.206 1.994 5.123 4.606 3.086 6.273 4.158 0.705 7.664
theta[6] 10.670 7.307 14.680 4.351 3.048 6.320 5.630 3.932 7.522 5.142 1.570 8.735
Notes: 
(1) (2) Coefficients for lsp are contrasts with lsp[1] = percentage of shares < 25%, with intervals being: 
(2) Pre-tax profit margin, ebt_sale_ (aver), is categorized by its quartiles. Coefficients are contrasts with quartile 1 (smallest)
).,(],...,,(],,( 75|50|25|25| +∞−∞ xxxx
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Table 3b. Estimation results
Proportional Odds Model Proportional Odds Model Proportional Odds Model Proportional Odds Model
finind finret finsale finshr
 node  Mean
95% Bayes
Credible interval  Mean
95% Bayes
Credible interval  Mean
95% Bayes
Credible interval  Mean
95% Bayes
Credible interval
Independent Variables
asset_size_2000 0.173 -1.023 1.356 0.016 -0.623 0.703 0.101 -0.652 0.898 -0.040 -0.924 0.900
asset_size_2000_sq -0.573 -2.139 0.806 -0.011 -0.666 0.670 -0.223 -1.172 0.559 0.084 -0.795 0.901
dins -0.424 -2.268 1.289 -1.170 -1.991 -0.314 1.755 0.801 2.771 1.752 0.387 2.941
foreign -1.212 -2.698 0.403 -1.147 -1.942 -0.374 -0.270 -1.103 0.553 -1.196 -2.329 -0.102
debt_2000 0.076 0.027 0.184 0.000 -0.016 0.018 0.001 -0.018 0.021 0.001 -0.033 0.032
ilab -2.715 -5.038 -0.481 0.154 -0.986 1.429 1.188 -0.482 2.595 0.773 -1.090 2.478
ires -1.258 -3.590 0.958 0.338 -1.033 1.685 0.857 -0.786 2.438 0.932 -1.034 2.869
iservices -7.710 -21.640 -0.922 0.847 -0.848 2.533 1.208 -1.282 3.584 -0.240 -4.213 3.025
itech -1.871 -3.969 0.237 -0.327 -1.421 0.868 1.081 -0.638 2.510 0.573 -1.406 2.281
lead 2.408 0.779 4.099 -0.282 -1.282 0.675 0.419 -0.726 1.589 -0.314 -1.913 1.167
lsp[2] 25-49% 0.956 -0.337 2.182 -1.198 -2.272 -0.181 0.070 -1.003 1.109 0.974 -0.232 2.320
lsp[3] 50-74% 0.286 -1.437 1.778 -0.802 -1.756 0.197 -0.917 -2.038 0.263 -0.397 -1.770 0.878
lsp[4] 75-100% 0.232 -1.115 1.601 -0.986 -1.829 -0.080 -0.185 -1.097 0.812 0.647 -0.595 1.846
poland 3.581 1.497 5.979 -1.007 -1.736 -0.220 1.049 0.186 2.036 0.222 -1.000 1.383
ebt_sale_(aver)_[2] 1.046 -0.216 2.228 0.551 -0.397 1.431 0.283 -0.650 1.139 -0.889 -1.987 0.149
ebt_sale_(aver)_[3] -0.233 -1.632 1.106 0.753 -0.092 1.614 -1.088 -2.146 -0.191 -1.419 -2.622 -0.224
ebt_sale_(aver)_[4] -0.274 -1.760 1.201 0.928 -0.057 1.899 -0.840 -1.918 0.240 -0.761 -2.124 0.599
Cutpoints
theta[1] 3.522 2.137 5.282 -5.100 -6.610 -3.785 1.856 -0.080 3.132 1.922 -0.511 4.015
theta[2] 4.284 2.858 6.054 -4.584 -6.020 -3.377 2.662 0.684 3.954 2.780 0.249 4.863
theta[3] 5.096 3.606 6.919 -3.840 -5.228 -2.676 3.370 1.354 4.623 3.251 0.683 5.306
theta[4] 5.818 4.204 7.738 -2.946 -4.319 -1.742 4.152 1.993 5.508 3.952 1.362 6.068
theta[5] 7.751 5.451 10.710 -2.262 -3.653 -1.049 4.865 2.604 6.309 4.348 1.713 6.614
theta[6] 9.854 6.731 13.980 -1.223 -2.605 0.034 5.825 3.322 7.422 5.386 2.457 7.916
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Table 3c. Estimation results
Proportional Odds Model Binary Logit Binary Logit
finstrat un_fi_in unc_fin
 Mean
95% Bayes
Credible interval  Mean
95% Bayes
Credible interval
95% Bayes
Credible interval
Independent Variables
asset_size_2000 -0.211 -1.147 0.639 -0.896 -1.929 0.368 1.063 -0.133 2.064
asset_size_2000_sq 0.194 -0.602 1.032 0.702 -0.567 1.753 0.070 -1.237 1.768
dins -0.703 -2.021 0.536 1.341 0.216 2.599 -0.433 -1.774 0.770
foreign -1.401 -2.454 -0.398 0.714 -0.272 1.787 0.504 -0.564 1.490
debt_2000 0.001 -0.020 0.023 0.141 -0.402 0.730 0.030 -0.613 0.654
ilab 0.618 -1.010 2.460 0.053 -1.980 2.113 13.220 6.982 19.850
ires 0.539 -1.021 2.442 -0.200 -2.311 1.737 12.400 6.113 19.260
iservices -26.130 -72.010 -1.414 -1.022 -3.851 1.438 13.540 7.029 20.630
itech 1.330 -0.372 3.103 -0.574 -2.686 1.348 13.970 7.661 20.630
lead 0.856 -0.314 1.955 -0.183 -1.404 1.112 0.639 -0.746 1.997
lsp[2] 25-49% 0.860 -0.318 2.054 0.567 -0.456 1.563 0.451 -0.675 1.623
lsp[3] 50-74% -1.627 -2.867 -0.223 0.172 -0.798 1.167 0.375 -0.884 1.561
lsp[4] 75-100% -0.423 -1.377 0.525 0.003 -1.982 1.896 -0.015 -1.885 1.936
poland -2.115 -3.180 -1.171 -0.115 -1.109 0.848 -0.857 -1.924 0.236
ebt_sale_(aver)_[2] 0.698 -0.305 1.742 -0.342 -1.364 0.716 0.363 -0.777 1.529
ebt_sale_(aver)_[3] 0.021 -1.076 1.095 0.961 -0.121 2.167 0.156 -0.898 1.249
ebt_sale_(aver)_[4] -0.418 -1.500 0.744 0.718 -0.495 1.887 1.176 0.020 2.302
Cutpoints
theta[1] -0.891 -3.217 0.610
theta[2] -0.330 -2.663 1.162
theta[3] 0.519 -1.856 2.076
theta[4] 1.021 -1.335 2.558
theta[5] 1.576 -0.794 3.213
theta[6] 2.846 0.432 4.673
Intercept -0.091 -2.607 2.329 -13.840 -20.130 -8.050
